A principal -agent (P -A) model is used to analyse the effect of environmental performance indicators (EPI) on environmental risk sharing within the firm. To achieve due diligence, the principal (top management), having to use imperfect performance indicators and fearing penalties for environmental damages, wants to avoid environmental harm and induce the agent (employee manipulating hazardous materials) to take appropriate action. To motivate the agent, the principal offers an incentive contract based on environmental stewardship performance (as measured by EPI).
There is significant evidence that in the last decade the stakes involved in firm and individual liability have been raised significantly. Between 1994 and 1996 in the US over 600 defendants were criminally charged for environmental offences and over 3,000 months of jail time was served over that same period (USEPA, 1997) . 1997 was a record year for enforcement, convictions and sentencing with 13 criminal sentences and 26 criminal cases being referred to the US Department of Justice (USEPA, 1998) . The largest criminal fine too was collected in that year, amounting to $9.5 million (USEPA, 1998) . In 1995, as the result of civil enforcement action by the United States Environmental Protection Agency, firms were forced to spend close to $1.65 billion to bring facilities into compliance (Parkinson, 1996) .
While criminalisation of environmental performance has been on the rise, piercing the veil of the corporation, firms have also been turning to environmental management systems to manage their environmental conduct. This manuscript studies the convergence of greater firm-level risks and firms' usage of environmental management systems (EMS) to mitigate those risks. The results indicate that there may be significant weaknesses in the EMS approach.
In recent years, the strategy for achieving environmental stewardship 1 on the part of industry has changed. Since the mid-1980's, there has been a rapid rise in the application of environmental management systems. For example, there are currently over 14,000 firms worldwide with ISO 14001 certification and over 1,000 in North America (Peglau 2000) . This research is directed at what may be a significant weakness of environmental management systems, environmental performance indicators (EPI) and the uneven risk sharing between management and labour within the firm that may result. The contribution of this research is not only the modelling and analysis of the EPI problem, but the elaboration of several corrective strategies firms might employ.
The implementation of an EMS not only fundamentally changes the relationship between the government and the firm, but there are important implications within the firm as well. While misallocation of environmental resources has been often studied, little work has been conducted on the misallocations that occur within the firm (Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné, 1993) . One of the most important implications, for executives, of the changing regulatory environment is how to reduce uncertainty with respect to the production of negative environmental events. While markets, both internal and external, are well established, providing signals as to the production level and optimal input mix for goods (commodities 2 ) for the firm, the market for discommodities is uncertain at best.
The implication is that while strategy for commodity production is commonplace, the strategy for discommodity minimisation is much less clear. This results in a world of extensive uncertainties for the manager; combined with potentially catastrophic risks, not a good combination for a manager.
While much of the work related to EMS implementation has thoroughly addressed the guidelines as specified in an EMS (Piaseki, 1995; Klassen, 1995; Friedman, 1997; Kuhre, 1998) questions having to do with the uncertainty arising from employee actions have not been addressed. We would argue that these behavioural uncertainties are the key to successful EMS implementation in terms of true environmental stewardship and hazard reduction. Segerson and Tietenberg (1992) focused on this problem in their study of the optimal penalty, either fines (at the individual and firm level) or incarceration (at the individual level). They describe how the efficient shifting of environmental costs between the firm and the employee, in reality, is difficult with respect to discommodity production.
Not only is monitoring output and effort problematic but discommodities jointness, long lag times, and wage adjustment insensitivities renders efficient internal resource allocation difficult (Segerson and Tietenberg 1992) . Gabel and Sinclaire-Desgagné (1993) and Sinclaire-Desgagné and Gabel (1997) too address this question of effective managerial strategies. They raise the important point as to the limits of incentive wages to elicit proper stewardship behaviour on the part of the agent; especially when the real optimand of the firm involves both commodity and discommodity production (Gabel and SinclaireDesgagné, 1993) . As a result, there may be an important role for environmental audits in EMS implementation to more properly align incentives between the principal and the agent (SinclaireDesgagné and Gabel, 1997) . Although critical to the effectiveness of environmental audits, in terms of agent performance, performance is difficult to measure and thus is difficult to integrate into an incentive scheme.
While Xepapadeas (1997) is writing about point and non-point pollution and the firm regulator interface, he addresses a critical component of managing discommodity production, information asymmetry. Two important issues are the uncertainty with respect to measuring discommodity production and the moral hazard associated with a principal's inability to monitor effort. In the case where the penalty for a negative environmental event cannot be assigned to the offender, one strategy has been to assess an industry level or collective penalty. One shortcoming is that if negative events are highly uncertain; say as the result of stochastic properties (not unrealistic when considering environmental discommodities), employee resentment might be high. This could result in low levels of co-operation, as group members become subjected not only to the behaviour of environmental free riders in the group, but to chance events as well. Such an environment provides an incentive for group members to invest in systems and practices that reduce the informational asymmetry with respect to their own actions in exchange for reduced collective penalties (Xepapadeas 1997).
These approaches used to reduce the uncertainty arising from agent behaviour using incentive based mechanisms whether they be fines, incarceration, audits, ambient taxes or input-based schemes, hinge upon one fundamental assumption, the ability to measure either output, input, or effort.
Performance metrics are necessary for a properly functioning agency relationship. Thus at the crux of the issue of managerial success and effective environmental management is the problem of environmental performance indicators. The disincentive mechanisms are foiled when, as is often the case in environmental management, the mapping between damage and incremental causative agent is indeterminable (Segerson and Tietenberg 1992) . Therefore, the extreme difficulty of measuring discommodity production renders the traditional internal governance measures, i.e. wages, between principals (senior management) and agents (rank and file), impotent. It is this predicament for the manager concerning environmental performance indicators on which this paper focuses. Using a principal -agent model, the paper explores the challenge for firms, the implications for managers, and makes some suggestions for remediation procedures.
II. Statement of the Problem
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A firm that adopts an environmental management system engages in an agency relationship. In this relationship the principal, fearing financial penalties for environmental damages and wanting to achieve due diligence 3 , tries to induce the agent (the employee responsible for controlling environmental hazard) to take preventive actions and avoid environmental harm. The difficulty arises from the principal's inability to perfectly observe the actions of the agent due to high monitoring costs and technical unfeasibility. The principal too may not be able to observe output (environmental stewardship) to infer the agent's level of compliance effort.
To ensure her employee (agent) is acting responsibly vis -à-vis the environment, the firm's top management (principal) uses a compensation payment scheme, y (·), to optimise the agent's compliance effort (e), so that his behaviour is in line with the firm's environmental policy. Only with a properly designed scheme can the principal elicit appropriate levels of environmental stewardship 4 and meet the due diligence test. The principal has a utility function, U P (·), and risk neutrality is assumed on her behalf, (i.e., U P '' (·) = 0). The agent has a utility function, U A (·), which is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and concave to represent risk aversion (i.e., U' A (·) > 0 and U'' A (·) ≤ 0 ). His utility is separable in income and effort
5
. The agent prefers less effort to more effort, therefore the cost of effort to the agent, C(e), is positive and increasing (i.e. C'(e) >0
and C''(e) >0 ) and is denominated in terms of utils.
III. Using EPI
A. The Model
In a previous paper (Goldsmith and Basak 1999) , a model was developed to describe the relationship between a principal and her agent in an environmentally risky firm. In that model, it was assumed that the principal could infer the level of the agent's compliance effort by observing output (i.e., stewardship) and that she could motivate her agent to deliver stewardship by paying a compensation payment (y(·)). This payment was a function of a stewardship output measure (x), which was naively free of uncertainty. Unfortunately this true stewardship measure does not exist in the real world.
Extending the P-A concept from that previous paper, the compensation payment (y(·)) now depends on an environmental performance indicator (EPI) score denoted by 2. EPI are a series of metrics used to measure compliance in either the day-to-day activity of the firm or for annual environmental impact assessments. These "gauges" are being used more and more by proactive companies (Epstein 1996; Metcalf et al. 1996) because they provide an indication of the company's environmental impact and help managers implement actions to improve environmental compliance.
An example of such an EPI is Nortel Networks' environmental performance index 6 . Nortel's index is an aggregate score based on environmental releases, number of fines received, etc., and resembles other industry efforts 7 to develop environmental performance metrics.
The following model highlights the contractual components that affect the attainment of the principal's objective, namely stewardship:
Participation constraint
First order incentive compatibility constraint 8
The principal wishes to maximise her utility (U p (⋅)), subject to the agent's willingness to participate (participation constraint (2)) and to the alignment of his incentives with his effort level (incentive compatibility constraint (3)). K θ reflects the cost of operating an EPI system. The participation constraint (2) is included in the contract in order to offer the agent at least as much utility as his next best opportunity (his reservation utility, U 0A ). The incentive compatibility constraint (3) is introduced in the model to ensure that the agent does not deliver a low level of stewardship and that the high effort alternative is always preferred 9 . f(2,e⋅), is the probability density function of the possible environmental outcomes due to the agent's effort level . f e (⋅), denotes a partial derivative with respect to effort (e) and allows for optimum effort to be conscripted through the contract.
Solving the principal's utility maximization problem with respect to the payment scheme (y), the resulting optimal risk-sharing rule is:
The EPI score ( 2) affects the principal's utility U p (2 -y(2) -K θ ) in three ways. First, as 2 increases, it directly increases her utility because she prefers better environmental performance (as measured by the EPI score) to worse performance. Second, increases in 2 lead to higher payments to the agent (y(2)). These are costly to the principal thereby decreasing her utility. Lastly, the transaction costs associated with the EPI (K θ ), which include the cost of designing the EPI and the collection and entry of data in the information system, gives disutility to the principal. Alternatively, the agent is attempting to maximize his utility where compensation has a positive effect, effort has a negative effect, and environmental performance has no direct impact.
The ratio of the marginal utilities (U' P (⋅) / U' A (⋅)) in (4) shows that incremental changes in the payment (y) affect both the principal and the agent. The principal's utility (U P ) increases with a marginal increase in the agent's optimal level of effort (e*) because more effort leads to higher stewardship (shown by f e (⋅)). The agent's utility increases indirectly because effort leads to higher EPI scores (again, shown by f e (⋅)) and consequently increases the agent's payment (y( 2)).
In (4), 8 is the basic marginal utility wage paid by the principal to the agent, the principal's shadow price for the participation constraint (Equation 2) 10 . It can be interpreted as a fixed wage the principal must pay when she can directly observe the agent's effort. In a full information context, there would be no need to use the incentive payment y(⋅) to control compliance effort indirectly; the optimal contract would therefore be a constant wage (Kreps 1990 ). The principal, in that case, could directly observe the agent's level of effort and control it via the contract (Gravelle and Rees 1992).
The relative effort multiplier, : [·], shows how costly it is (in terms of the principal's utils) to cause the agent to deliver the optimal compliance effort 11 . It is the principal's shadow price for the first order incentive compatibility constraint (Equation 3).
The likelihood ratio in (4), f e (2, e) / f(2, e), was derived by rearranging the Kuhn-Tucker condition (differentiated with respect to y) of the maximisation problem, maximising (1) subject to (2) 
and (3).
This ratio is assumed to be monotone, non-decreasing and concave in 2. It is also a significant component of the P-A model because it illustrates the strength of relationship between effort and the EPI score. It measures the ratio of the likelihood of observing a given EPI score (2 i ) as the agent chooses the optimal effort level (e*), to the likelihood of observing this same 2 i as the agent chooses any level of effort (e i ) (Varian 1992) . Therefore, the higher the ratio, the more likely the principal will be paying for high levels of effort. As the likelihood ratio increases, the principal can infer that the agent is giving a high level of effort (e*) and not a sub-optimal level of effort (e i ), thus reducing the probability of overly low EPI scores.
Since compliance effort (e) is thought to be driving 2, the higher the likelihood ratio, the more output (the EPI score) is a function of effort. So the principal pays : [·] when the relationship between e and 2 appears to be strong. This means that the principal pays the agent a fixed amount (8) plus an additional "motivational" amount ( : [·] ) that stems from the incentive compatibility constraint (Equation 3) (Goldsmith and Basak 1999) . Therefore the motivational amount (: [·] ) renders the agent's compensation (y(·)) dependent on the environmental performance measure (2) and effort (e) via this likelihood ratio f e (·)/f(·) 12 . This is significant because compensation, the traditional and most significant behavioural control mechanism employed by management, becomes in part a function of the ability to measure EPI (output) and effort. If this relationship were to break down, managerial control is weakened and improper risk sharing would result.
In the limit, if suboptimal effort (e i ) has no effect on observing a given EPI score, the denominator of the likelihood ratio (f(·)) is zero, rendering the ratio indeterminate. More realistically, if suboptimal effort levels have little effect on obtaining a given EPI score, then the denominator approaches zero and the likelihood ratio can take the maximum value of 4. Thus, if e* leads to a high probability of observing 2 i , the principal will pay a high premium to the agent. In other words, as effort becomes increasingly significant in terms of observing 2 i , the agent delivers a differentiating type of effort (e*), a motivational wage is justified and compensation rises above the fixed wage (8). This implies that increased payments to the agent are justified and would affect behavior. The principal, by means of the payment scheme, has a greater ability to control the outcome (the EPI score). Conversely, if for example, the EPI score, 2 i , is a function of an act of God (i.e., P(2 i )* e* . P(2 i )* e i ) rather than the agent's effort, the optimal payment scheme reverts to 8. This is the crux of the manager's problem, not only the asymmetry of information between effort and output, but measuring output at all.
B. Effort
Through the compensation plan, the principal attempts to control the level of effort exerted by the agent. Critical to realising an optimum plan is understanding the marginal impacts of changes in the agent's effort. By taking the partial derivative of the maximisation problem (i.e. max (1) s.t. (2) and (3)) with respect to effort (e)) the following is obtained:
The left -hand side of the equation is the marginal expected value product to the principal of the agent's effort. Included are the marginal costs to the principal due to the disutility from paying the agent (-y( θ )(f e ( θ* e * )). The marginal benefits to the principal arise from the increased compliance effort by the agent ((θ)(f e (θ*e * ))); which lowers the probability of damages. The right-hand side contains three elements: 1) the basic marginal utility wage (8); 2) the marginal cost to the agent of increased effort (C'(e*)); and 3) the increased probability of greater stewardship, and consequently higher payments to the agent, (y( θ )(f e ( θ* e * ))).
If it is imperative for the principal to elicit high effort and she only has θ on which to base compensation then the question is: how difficult is it to obtain this stewardship measure (θ)? If this measure is readily available and reliable, the efficient contract can be drawn up and stewardship will result. If it is a cumbersome measure, the contract will break down.
IV. EPI and Uncertainty
The state of the firm's stewardship is a difficult measure to obtain due to the complexity of environmental performance assessment that leads to high levels of information asymmetry.
Five types of measurement difficulties associated with EPI contribute to this problem. These give rise to managerial uncertainties, which in turn affect the formulation of an efficient P-A contract:
First, since pollution is a dynamic problem, products, production processes and their associated pollutants change continuously, requiring metrics that can adapt to these changes (Carlson and Sholtz 1994) . There are also the cumulative effects of pollutants that may only be observed over long periods of time. Trace amounts barely observable today may build up, causing significant environmental damage over the long run. Second, hidden hazards are involved. The lack of observability for some pollutants, due either to improper auditing or to technological limitations of pollution measurement tools (Russel et al. 1986 ), can make EPI less reliable measures of true stewardship. Third, the subjectivity of the EPI score is problematic. Choices governing which pollutant or waste is to be tracked are influenced by various factors, such as the cost of sampling (i.e., cheaper and less precise sampling procedures may be chosen), current legal requirements, the environmental staff's current knowledge, and public expectations. For example, there has been much public debate in recent years as to which emission measures should be included in an overall EPI index (e.g., the case of City of Columbus 13 ). Also the USEPA recently revealed in a study of 75 firms that no relationship could be determined between an entity's environmental performance and their statement of environmental policies (Business and the Environment, 1999) . Reflecting a lack of precision associated with EPI. Fourth, there is a problem of data aggregation. An EPI score consists of a series of imperfect measures of the firm's level of compliance, such as: air emissions (e.g., tons of NO x , SO x ), effluents (e.g., BOD 14 readings), spills, etc. These environmental statistics are aggregated into a single index or score and therefore may not give a clear or direct indication of the mapping between effort and stewardship. Also, because spills vary in terms of size and toxicity (Naimon 1994) , some data, such as number of spills, do not give an appropriate signal of environmental quality. Finally, there is the significant problem of stochastic environmental events.
Pollution output may be stochastic in nature (Beavis and Walker 1983; Bystrom and Bromley 1996) and not entirely the result of direct or preventive management strategies. Many factors outside the workers' control influence environmental performance, such as the environment's buffering capacity, weather, cumulative effects, or acts of God. Therefore, if the EPI score (2) is high, senior management cannot entirely be certain whether it is due to the agent's effort or to luck.
The first four limitations result in performance measures that are unclear and cumbersome to define.
The fifth limitation, stochastic processes, contributes to an additional level of managerial uncertainty. Although in most firms, performance indicators are well established for profit-centre activities, allowing for the proper mapping between incentives and effort, the above characteristics make EPI implementation difficult. For example, a cost reduction goal is very clear to a production manager;
he knows savings can be realised either through downsizing, choosing alternative suppliers, etc. The outcome of the cost reduction mandate is measurable in dollars and therefore readily recognisable.
Monetised measures of performance are a prevalent part of corporate culture and are clear signals for both internal and external stakeholders. For the environmental manager, however, a stewardship improvement goal is a nebulous concept because its measurability is based on a non-monetised EPI score. Therefore, a manager or employee who performs a series of tasks to reduce the pollution burden may not see the results as directly as those efforts directed towards profit-centred or costreducing activities. As well, managers have to prioritise, and set weights for these various monetised and non-monetised objectives.
A. Implications
Implications for the Agent
For the agent, the lack of precision and clarity associated with the EPI creates an incompatibility between his incentives and his corresponding participation (his delivery of an appropriate level of effort and the corresponding true stewardship output). If the agent's incentive payment is based on an imprecise measure, he may chose not to participate because the risk of being unfairly evaluated may be too high (i.e., the participation constraint will bind). The lack of precision may also fall short of providing the agent with an incentive to select a high effort level, as opposed to a low effort level (i.e., the first order constraint may not bind). This would certainly defeat the principal's goal of eliciting maximum effort from the agent in order to share and reduce the firm's risk, and ultimately attaining true stewardship.
Implications for the Principal
One purpose of EPI metrics is to enable benchmarking and measure progress related to agent performance. With poor information on environmental performance, the firm's policy may be poorly implemented and tracking its progress will be diffic ult. Precision assures the principal that she is paying her employees for results. Remember that the principal is paying the agent based on stewardship output; if the stewardship measure is poorly specified, she has no way of measuring her workers' performance or progress. Also, an imprecise EPI may cause the principal to offer the wrong incentive for the agent, resulting in sub-optimal levels of effort, which in turn will negatively affect stewardship and increase the principal's risk exposure.
For exa mple, take a firm that has an EPI that gives (subjective) importance to a given pollutant (e.g., 10% in the overall EPI score is allocated to water pollutant z), but has poor measurement for that pollutant (e.g., its gauge only traces effluents in PPM 15 instead of PPB 16 ). Under-detecting this "important" pollutant may give the firm a false sense of stewardship and an overly high EPI score.
This in turn will increase the payment to the agent, giving him a signal that he is doing his job correctly. While in the short run this may seem to be appropriate, in the long run, true stewardship may not be attained.
Finally, an advantage of precise metrics for environmental performance measurement is the reduction of uncertainty in terms of the firm's liability. If the firm's stewardship state is unknown, the liability problem of hidden hazards may not only prove to be distracting for the principal but may also lead to poor decision making.
The managerial implications of these results might indicate that if the EPI is satisfactorily measurable, then a wage policy based on a motivational or incentive system would be appropriate. Alternatively, if information asymmetries abound due to the EPI problems described above, then a salary or fixed wage policy might be in order. But if it is believed that EPI are flawed indicators of effort and environmental stewardship, then such a salary policy will not address the fundamental problems of agent incentives and moral hazard and alternative mechanisms become necessary.
V. Industry Response
The lack of precise EPI is a problem of major concern for environmentally risky firms. New initiatives by the International Organisation for Standardisation are an indication of the need for standardisation in firm environmental performance evaluations (EPE). Their efforts involve the establishment of an international standard, namely ISO 14031, which were due to be published in 1999 (Bowers and Cornish, 1999) . Such a standard could permit corporations worldwide to be compared through the use of standardised EPE and a corresponding set of EPI (Cornish 1997).
Once an agreement is reached on ISO 14031 and standardised EPI, it will facilitate firms' efforts to measure their environmental performance, enabling them to reduce the burden of the current ad hoc EPI creation. Standardised EPE and EPI will give guidance and institutional support to firms striving for stewardship and may help reduce the uncertainty associated with such metrics. ISO 14032, a companion document is to be released at the same time. This publication will provide case examples of 17 firms worldwide that have implemented EPI programs (Bowers and Cornish, 1999) 17 .
The model shows that because environmental stewardship is difficult to quantify, the use of EPIbased compensation will have imperfect results in terms of incentive alignment. If uncertainty is pervasive in terms of measuring output (i.e., EPI are flawed), then it may be difficult to share the environmental risk and deliver the appropriate level of stewardship. The complex nature of environmental problems and the firm's inability to measure true stewardship will continue to make it difficult to implement contracts based on the traditional principal -agent approach where incentive payments are aligned with output. Either of two strategies must occur to more closely achieve the efficient P-A contract where risk is shared: 1) improve stewardship metrics or 2) develop alternative risk-sharing mechanisms.
With respect to improving the metrics, additional work similar to that which is currently being done in the industry is needed to address the above measurement problems. Such a highly charged issue for the firm necessitates precision and consistency in order to reduce dissonance between the principal and the agent. But in the end, the inherent characteristics of EPI as discussed above, may make truly functional metrics, like those associated with the production of commodities, unattainable. Given this, management's time may be better spent on the second option; develo ping and implementing improved risk-sharing policies. The following takes a look at such strategies as accountability procedures, commitment premiums, and merit deductibles. They may prove valuable for achieving more efficient labour contracts, thereby improving intra-firm risk sharing and true environmental stewardship.
VI. Effort Monitoring and Accountability
A. Model Description
In order to improve the risk sharing between the principal and agent, an information system is used.
The system entails a monitoring signal (ψ) that is independent of outcome 18 . It is not an observation of output (environmental quality) per se; but a signal of the agent's effort in terms of his adoption of preventive measures. This signal is controlled through a paper trail that would, for example, require employees to sign documents attesting that they have performed appropriate preventive tasks. A performance audit scheme could be put in place to verify employees' adoption of preventive tasks, at a cost K ψ per audit. All signed documents, filed electronically as part of the firm's environmental information system, would enable the tracking and comparison of adopted preventive tasks (ψ) to the EPI score (θ). When comparing ψ and θ, the environmental manager should hope to see a strong correlation between these two variables 19 . Therefore, effort monitoring and accountability mechanisms focus on reducing the information asymmetry with respect to agent effort, not on EPI measurement.
Not only is effort monitoring critical in efficient contracting to improve the information about the agent's level of effort, but preventive effort also needs to be tracked in order to demonstrate due diligence and to control for the dissonance between profit and stewardship goals. This new information system facilitates the alignment of incentives, as the paper trail establishes responsibility and accountability for acts of negligence. From these considerations a new optimand, participation constraint, and first order constraint are developed (1), (2), and (3).
Optimand
Max
The participation constraint
The first order constraint ∫ U A (y(2, ψ)) h e (2, e) g(ψ, e) + U A (y( 2, ψ)) h(2, e) g e (ψ, e) d2dψ = C'(e)
The optimal sharing rule is then The information system cost (K ψ ) affects the marginal utility of the principal, and the compensation payment is now function of the signal of preventive tasks (ψ) in addition to the stewardship measure (2).
B. Implications
As the monitoring signal (ψ) is independent from output (as measured by 2), its probability density function f(2, ψ, e) is (h(2, e))(g(ψ, e)), where h(·) shows how effort affects the EPI score (2) and g (·) shows how effort affects the preventive tasks signal. When the ratio g e (·)/g(·) in Equation 9 is a constant, the monitoring signal has no value (Holmstrom 1979) . The signal has value only when g(·) depends on e (to any extent). If the optimal level of effort e* does not affect the probability density function (i.e. g e (·) = 0), then the information signal is useless to the principal. When g e (·) = 0, the paper trail does not contribute to the principal's objective of measuring her employee's level of compliance effort. Of course, when g e (·) > 0 the principal will choose to continue her monitoring program as long as the cost (K ψ ) is lower than the benefits of obtaining the signal ψ.
To decrease monitoring and information system costs (K ψ ), various ex post investigation schemes could be used. These schemes might only call for more thorough environmental audits once low stewardship is noticed through casual observation 20 (i.e. regular daily "environmental check-ups").
The principal also could choose to implement an investigation scheme, where she would seek to obtain the signal ψ in a random fashion 21 . These systems are possible alternatives to costly full-time monitoring.
This model shows that the introduction of a preventive task signal, a paper trail and a corresponding information system will lead to improved information flows between the principal and the agent and consequently will increase environmental risk sharing. This addresses the asymmetry stemming from the dissonance between firm profits and stewardship goals and indicates the importance of comprehensively integrating stewardship tasks throughout the firm.
However, effort monitoring and accountability may not be sufficient to fully and optimally manage the environmental risk. Transaction costs are high and information is imperfect. The next section offers two additional tools to manage environmental information asymmetries.
VII. Commitment Premiums and Merit Deductibles
In addition to the use of preventive task audits with accountability paper trails and ex post investigation schemes, two additional strategies are available to environmental managers to improve executive-employee risk sharing and deal with information asymmetry. In this section, insurance-like mechanisms are analysed as possible aids to improve intra-firm environmental risk sharing.
A. Model Description: Commitment Premiums
The first mechanism to consider is a commitment premium (CP). In the context of intra-firm environmental risk sharing, the employee pays his commitment premium in kind by attending environment, health and safety seminars, environmental awareness colloquiums, etc. This commitment premium corresponds to the level of risk, local or global, an employee represents to the firm. Global risk is the industry's susceptibility to environmental hazard, whereas local risks are firm and agent-specific. For example, a worker in a chemical plant (high global risk) with a history of poor environmental practices (high local risk) would be required to receive more environmental training (in order to demonstrate a higher level of commitment) than an office clerk (low local risk) in a university (low global risk).
The goal of the CP is to force the agent to make an ex ante "investment" in environmental protection, helping to insure against environmental risk for the firm. This strategy attempts to align the agent's perceptions about the firm's environmental management strategy more closely with the true state in the firm. The commitment premium could be too low, resulting in cognitive dissonance and thereby causing the principal to bear more of the risk. It is not necessarily true that high-risk exposure for the principal is the result of the firm being "greener" than the agent. A low CP implies dissonance only, whereby the agent and the principal have different perceptions of appropriate stewardship behaviour; part of the information asymmetry problem associated with environmental management systems.
One can imagine an agent who is evangelical could expose the principal to as much risk as an agent who is cavalier 22 .
A commitment premium can be too high where agents are fatigued by training 23 making the cost of the premium equal or exceed the expected losses or risks to the agent. In this sense the agent would bear more of the risk and in essence would be self-insuring, thus making the insurance contract redundant. The correct CP level serves as the agent's investment or commitment, encouraging efficient risk sharing. This increases the principal's utility because she assumes that trained or "invested" employees will deliver more appropriate levels of stewardship.
The CP enters into the principal's optimand (5) in the form of a net benefit (P) (risk reduction minus training costs) and is modelled in the agent's participation (6) and first-order constraints (7) as a cost (effort with no direct compensation).
Using a simplified version of the previous model, the commitment premium is added to the principal's optimand, the agent's participation and first-order constraints.
and ∫ U A (y(2) -P) f e (2, e) d2 = C'(e)
The optimal risk-sharing rule when the commitment premium is included becomes
Rearranging (8), placing the marginal benefits of varying the payment scheme on the right-hand side and the marginal costs on the left-hand side shows how the commitment premium imposes an additional cost to the agent due to increased effort while delivering additional benefits in the form of higher utility to the principal.
B. Implications of Commitment Premiums
It behoves firms concerned about environmental performance to direct resources towards the area of environmental training and awareness in order to achieve a truly strategic environmental management plan. Unfortunately, there is an inherent difficulty in choosing the appropriate commitment premium.
How much does the principal want her agent to "invest" in terms of commitment to the firm's environmental policy? The intrusiveness of the premium to the agent needs to be kept in mind when attempting to elicit participation in the EMS, as the commitment premium is dependent on the agent's reservation utility 24 . In order for the agent to participate, the compensation payment must increase to reflect the additional burden of the premium. Also, the return on training investment is a difficult business metric to calculate. The commitment premium is useful in helping the principal decrease local risk through employee training and sensitization. However, such an instrument does not contain contingency elements; thus incentives may not be adequately aligned. The commitment premium may help reduce the probability of a negative environmental event by decreasing local risk, but is devoid of any direct disincentives. Thus, implementing a program of CP may not be sufficient to manage a firm's risk exposure because, like the many of the mechanisms mentioned above, it is an indirect approach and would be subject to the same lack of precision weaknesses.
C. Model Description: Merit Deductibles
Merit deductibles may be a useful tool to align incentives more directly and share risk, especially when employed with an accountability system. Letting the agent bear significant responsibility for some of the environmental damage through the use of merit deductibles increases compliance effort and risk sharing 25 . Merit deductibles can take either of three forms, ranging from indirect to direct. 1) Indirect: They can be an internal system of merit deductions (e.g. privileges, advancements, perks, etc.) and peer pressure 26 (e.g. public disclosure of infractions);
2) They can involve a monetary contingency comp onent which would be implemented in the event of a corporate fine (e.g. the employee could share a fraction of the firm's fine) or an internal fining system could be established (e.g. senior management establishes a stewardship threshold and imposes a fine on employees that fail to meet this threshold); or 3) Direct: They can lift the veil of the corporation and hold involved agents liable for their destructive environmental behaviour. An example might be a policy of strict accountability whereby individuals' roles in the firm's environmental management are formally documented. In the event of a problem where due diligence on the part of the employee is not met, the individual as well as the firm would face the legal and/or financial consequences (Segerson and Tietenberg, 1992 ).
An important distinction between merit deductibles and the accountability paper trail is that with the former, the principal doesn't necessarily require the agent to adopt preventive tasks. The firm's role as a paternalistic entity (previous model) is replaced by one that is more of an entrepreneurial partnership.
External Contingency Fines
As 1) indirect and 3) direct risk sharing have been discussed in the literature, we focus here on the 2 nd form of merit deductible, external contingency fines. In order to see the impact on the EPI problem it is important to focus on changes to the principal and agent's utility functions. If an incident were to occur, the agent would face D (a mnemonic for deductible) with a probability Where F is the corporate fine (associated to a probability (l(2, e)) and its corresponding space [0, 2*]), as imposed by an external environmental authority (e.g. USEPA).
Internal Contingency Fines
In the case of an internal system of fines the responsible authority, i.e. the government, is unaware an infraction has occurred. The principal is therefore not subjected to a fine so the fine drops out of her utility function. Like an external responsible authority, she imposes fines recognizing their incentive value. This simplifies the optimands and adds greater determinism to the principal's problem. This policy though, while reflecting an alternative form of risk sharing places the principal and the agent in an adversarial relationship. The utility of the principal would be affected positively 28 , as D is a positive value for [0, 2*] and zero when above θ* (Equation 17) 29 .
U P (2 -y( 2) + P + D)
The agent's utility would be
In this case, D would be a fixed amount imposed by the principal, as stated in the firm's environmental policy, and would be levied when stewardship is unsatisfactory to senior management 30 .
D. Implications of Merit Deductibles
For the principal, merit deductibles are not a panacea for reducing managerial risk. If D is too large, the risk is entirely transferred to the agent and the principal's payment, y( ⋅), would need to be very large (possibly infinite) for him to participate. If D is too low, then the agent does not properly align incentives resulting in a moral hazard and/or cavalier behaviour 31 .
This last model illustrates that the limitations of ex-ante risk-sharing mechanisms are due to the fragility of the participation constraint. If the commitment premium or D is increased too much, the compensation payment needs to increase accordingly to motivate the agent. This may make the contract too costly for the principal. Any rational agent will choose not to participate if the risk exposure is too high or the payoff is too low. This is not surprising, as one of the attributes of the corporate organisational form is to shield employee-agents from this type of ownership risk. If this were not the case then the agents would prefer higher expected returns associated with an ownership position to compensate them for such risks. In such a world the "firm" would then comprise of a series of arms length contracts between independent firms/agents, nullifying the principal -agent intrafirm relationship. However, new legislation both in Canada and the US allow for the corporate veil to be lifted and the hand of the Law to reach employees responsible for acts of environmental negligence 32 (USEPA 1990; Environment Canada 1996) . Although no cases were found where employees have been held personally responsible in a Court of Law (through civil or criminal penalty) in either country, the institutional setting is in place for such sanctions.
VIII. Conclusion
The models outlined above, representing ex-ante labour contracts, address information asymmetries that are present in environmental management. The first model demonstrates the powerful implications of imperfect output measurement in terms of improper incentive alignment and the corresponding environmental risk for the firm. The second model shows that monitoring, through accountability procedures such as a "paper trail," will have a strong influence on employee behaviour. The last model, which integrates the use of insurance-like mechanisms, shows that risksharing opportunities are sensitive to the overall risk environment and the level of risk agents are willing to bear. In this model, the inclusion of a commitment premium and merit deductibles gives the agent a personal stake in the environmental risk, and the corresponding compensation payment may need to be very large to motivate participation. Consequently, with a risk neutral principal, the firm will weigh costs and benefits of sharing environmental risks and may choose to reduce the risk burden of the agents in order to limit their compensation payments.
The analytical models described above demonstrate the precariousness of environmental management. Not only is environmental management compromised by the secondary role it plays within the firm, but also its inherent characteristics contribute to high degrees of information asymmetry and moral hazard. Simply adopting an EMS does not address these issues. This paper argues that special attention is needed, based on the types of environmental risks the firm faces, to recognize and then correct the agency problems that abound. Environmental performance indicators, while critical in theory, have been shown in this research as well as other research to be cumbersome to implement effectively. The model also demonstrates how different the management of commodity production is from environmental management, which involves the production of discommodities.
This requires that managers employ targeted mechanisms, some of which the paper described, to achieve the desired level of stewardship for the firm.
IX. Further Research
The models above could be further developed to include multiple agents and to address more explicitly the peer monitoring (as Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) and Holmstrom (1982) ) and other aspects specific to moral hazard in teams (as previously modelled by Holmstrom (1982) 
